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Abstract—In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the re-
ceivers’ history of giving has a significant impact on the donor’s
decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents
things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation
can hardly emerge. In this work we use a Public Goods Game
to investigate whether publicly available reputation scores may
support the evolution of cooperation and whether this is affected
by the kind of network structure adopted. Moreover, if agents
interact on a bipartite graph with partner selection cooperation
can thrive in large groups and in a small amount of time.
KEYWORDS: Evolution of cooperation; Public Goods
Game; Network; Reputation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two neighbors may agree to drain a meadow, which they
possess in common: because it is easy for them to know each
other’s mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate
consequence of his failing in his part, is the abandoning of the
whole project. But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible,
that a thousand persons should agree in any such action; it
being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design,
and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks
a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expense, and would
lay the whole burden on the others.
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: J. M.
Dent, 1952, II, p.239) - From reference [1].
Humans show levels of cooperation among non-kin that are
unparalleled among other species. This difference becomes
striking when facing social dilemmas, i.e., situations in which
cooperation is hard to achieve because the best move for an
individual does not produce the best outcome for the group.
Public goods games (PGG) represent a clear exemplification of
this conflict between individual incentives and social welfare.
If everybody contributes to the public good, cooperation is
the social optimum, but free-riding on others’ contributions
represent the most rewarding option.
If norms, conventions and societal regulations have been
proven effective in preventing the collapse of public goods
(for a review, see [2], [3]), when individuals are faced with
unknown strangers, with little or no opportunities for future
re-encounters cooperation easily collapses, unless punishment
for non-cooperators is provided [4]. An alternative solution
is represented by reputation, through which cheaters can be
easily identified and avoided [5], [6]. Indirect reciprocity
supported by reputation [7] can be one of the mechanisms
explaining the evolution of cooperation in humans [8], espe-
cially in large groups of unrelated strangers who can, through
language, actively communicate about their past experiences
with cheaters [9].
As such, gossip may effectively bypass the “second-order
free-rider problem”, wherein the costs associated with solving
one social dilemma produces a new one [10], [11]. This is
the case of punishment: cooperators who do not sustain the
costs of punishment are better off than cooperators who also
punish. Therefore this solution to social dilemmas itself entails
a social dilemma, whereas gossip, being essentially free should
not imply such a second-order free-rider problem. In addition
to costly punishment and reputation, ostracism of free-riders
may represent a third solution. However, the direct effect
of ostracizing a member is that the group size decreases,
which automatically reduces maximal contribution levels to
the public good for all remaining periods. Maier-Rigaud
and colleagues show that in the lab PGG with ostracism
opportunities increases contribution levels and contrary to
monetary punishment, also has a significant positive effect on
net earnings [12].
Models of indirect reciprocity usually take into account
dyadic interactions [5], or group interactions in a mutual
aid game [13], in which providing help has a cost for the
helper but it also increases his/her image score, i.e., a publicly
visible record of his/her reputation. Image score increases
or decreases according to individuals’ past behaviors, thus
providing a reliable way to discriminate between cheaters and
cooperative players. Both in computer simulations [5], and in
lab experiments with humans [14], cooperation can emerge
and be maintained through image score.
When individuals facing a social dilemma can know other
players’ image score, cooperation can emerge in small groups,
as showed by Suzuki and Akiyama [15]. In their work,
cooperation can emerge and be maintained for groups of
four individuals; though, when group size increases there is a
concomitant decrease in the frequency of cooperation. The au-
thors explain this decline as due to the difficulty of observing
reputations of many individuals in large communities. This can
be true of unstructured communities, but this rarely happens
in human societies, characterized by interaction networks.
To account for the role of societal structure, we designed a
PGG in which players’ interactions depend on the kind of
network and on the possibility of actively choosing a subset
of group members. More specifically, we compare cooperation
levels among agents placed on a small-world network [16],
defined by short average path lengths and high clustering, to
the performance of agents on a bi-partite graph [17], [18].
The latter is generally used to model relations between two
different classes of objects, like affiliation networks linking
members and the groups they belong to. This structure is
especially interesting for us because it is especially suited
for partner selection, as it happens when a club refuses
membership to a potential associate.
Here, we are interested in exploring the effect of network
structure on the emergence of cooperation in a PGG. We
compare two different network topologies and we show that
reputation-based partner choice on a bi-partite graph can make
cooperation thrive also in large groups of agents. We also show
that this effect is robust to number of generations, group size
and total number of agents in the system.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a population of N individuals. In each round
of the game, g agents are picked up at random to play a PGG
among themselves. Players can cooperate contributing with a
cost c to a common pot, or can defect without paying anything.
Then, the total amount collected in the pot is multiplied for a
benefit b and equally distributed among all the group members,
without taking into account individual contributions. At the
end of each interaction, said χ the number of contributors in
the group, cooperators’ payoffs equals (χb/g − 1)c, whereas
defectors’ payoffs is χbc/g. At the collective level, the best
outcome is achieved when everyone cooperates, but cheaters
are better off, because defection permits to avoid a loss when
the number of cooperators is lower than gc/b.
Among the many solutions offered [4], Suzuki and
Akiyama [15] design a modified PGG in which agents can
identify cheaters thanks to the so-called image score [5],
[19]. The basic features of our model are the same of the
one by Suzuki and Akiyama: in particular, each player i
is characterized by two integer variables: the image score
si ∈ [−Smax, Smax] and the strategy ki ∈ [−Smax, Smax+1],
being Smax ≥ 0 a parameter of the model. When selected
to play a round of the game, an individual cooperates if the
average image score 〈s〉g of its opponents is equal to or higher
than its own strategy ki, otherwise it will not contribute. At
the end of the round, the image score of the player is increased
by 1 in case of cooperation, otherwise it is decreased by
the same quantity. In any case, si remains in the allowed
interval [−Smax, Smax]: if an agent has an image score of
Smax (−Smax) and contributes (defects), nothing happens to
its image score. At the initial stage, all the image scores and
fitness levels are set to zero, whilst the strategies are randomly
distributed among the individuals.
The image score is intended to give a quantitative evaluation
of the public reputation of an individual in the scope of
indirect reciprocity: if contributing once is rewarded by future
contributions by the other individuals, then any cooperative
action must be recognized and considered positively by the
entire population; on the other hand, the variability of the
strategies describes the different attitudes and expectations of
the single agents [5].
After m rounds, reproduction takes place. Again, we ap-
ply the same evolutionary algorithm used by Suzuki and
Akiyama [15]. For N times we select at random a pair of
individuals and with probability P we create a new individual
inheriting the strategy of the parent with the highest fitness.
Then parents are put again in the population, and offspring
is stored in another pool. When this selection process has
happened N times, the old population is deleted and replaced
with the offspring. It is worth noticing that offspring inherit
only the parent’s strategy, while their image score and fitness
is set equal to zero. Finally, we repeat all the procedure (m
rounds followed by the reproduction stage), for an adequate
number of generations. The simulation lasts until the system
reaches a final (steady or frozen) configuration.
For sake of clarity, we observe that strategies defined as
(k ≤ 0) are the more “cooperation prone”, with the limit case
of k = −Smax which is an absolute cooperator, while the
positive ones are the “cooperation averse” strategies, with the
limit case of k = Smax+1 representing an inflexible defector.
Moving from the model described above, we are interested
in testing whether two different network structures can pro-
mote cooperation for different group size and what effect
partner selection can have in such an environment.
III. RESULTS
A. Robustness of Suzuki’s and Akiyama’s results
Suzuki and Akiyama tested their model for a given set of
parameters with the following values: N = 200, c = 1, b =
0.85g, Smax = 5, m = 800. Their results show that a
cooperative strategy can evolve and invade a population when
group size g is small, but it does not survive when groups are
large. For medium-sized communities, a coexistence between
cooperators and defectors is possible.
The first step of the study present in this paper is a check
of the robustness of Suzuki and Akiyama results with respect
to the values of the model parameters. A check of the role of
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Fig. 1. Behaviour of the final frequency of cooperative actions as a function
of the group size g. All the parameters are the same of reference [15], except
b = 3. Each point averaged over 1000 realizations.
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Fig. 2. Behaviour of the frequency of cooperative actions as a function of
the number of generations for three different values of P : 0.75, 0.90 and
1.0. The remaining parameters are the same of reference [15]. Each curve
averaged over 1000 realizations.
m and N is reported already in [15]: it is claimed that the
outcome is not relevantly influenced by the value of these two
quantities, so we focus here on b, P and Smax.
The role of b in the PGG is quite clear in literature.
Normally it is set to a fixed value larger than one (often 3),
independent from the group size [20]. Using this value, we
found that the final cooperation level decreases sharpenly as
g increases, as shown in Fig. 1. The fact that in Suzuki’s and
Akiyama’s work such decreasing is much slower is due to the
fact that being b proportional to the group size the number of
contributors needed in order to make cooperation convenient
remains constant in g instead of decreasing with it. On the
other hand, even though less dramatic, the decrease is anyway
observed, indicating that the negative effect of large groups
on cooperation is stronger and it might depend on the PGG
dynamics itself.
Concerning the behaviour of the model as a function of the
parameter P , we tested three different values: P = 0.9 as
in [15], P = 0.75 and P = 1.0. As it can be easily seen
in Fig. 2, there is no fundamental difference due to the exact
value of this parameter.
Finally, changing the value of Smax, we see that up to
Smax ≃ 15, the behaviour of the system is rather homoge-
neous, as shown in Fig. 3.
Our results show that the behaviour of the model is actually
robust for a large range of the parameters at stake, thus
replicating Suzuky and Akiyama’s results.
1 5 25 125 625
S
max
0,001
0,01
0,1
1
fin
al
 c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
de
ns
ity
Fig. 3. Behaviour of the final frequency of cooperative actions as a function of
Smax. The remaining parameters are the same of reference [15], the vertical
line for Smax = 5 specifies the value utilized in reference [15]. Each point
averaged over 1000 realizations.
Fig. 4. Construction of SWN according Watts-Strogatz procedure. From
reference [16].
B. Small-world networks
In order to enlarge the scope of the model, we inserted
network structure in it, thus introducing some adaptations
into the original model. The first change we made was in
the mechanism of assortment. In the original model, every
player had the same probability to interact with every other
agent, therefore the population is placed on a total connected
graph (CG). This configuration is rather unrealistic, especially
when we consider groups bigger than a given size. It is then
interesting to test the model behaviour over more realistic,
even though still abstract, networks. The first example we
take under consideration is the so-called small-world network
(SWN), as conceived by Watts and Strogatz in [16]. In short,
a SWN, is a regular ring with few short-cuts linking originally
far away nodes. It is constructed as shown in Fig. 4: we start
from a ring where each node is connected with 2k nearest
neighbours. Then, with probability p, each link is rewired (one
of the node is left fixed, the other is changed), so that it finally
leads to the creation of a network with pNk short-cuts. As
shown in reference [16], for 1/Nk < p < 1/10 the network
shows the typical small-world effect: even though at local level
the system behaves as a regular lattice, i.e., an individual
placed in a SWN cannot distinguish the network from a
regular one just watching his/her neighbours (high clustering
coefficient), at a global level the average distance between two
randomly selected individuals is very low (proportional to the
logarithm of the system size), unlike the regular case.
In order to make the model work with this topology, we
had to adapt the model dynamics to the specific situation.
In particular, instead of extract g agents at each round, we
picked up a single player at each round and g − 1 of its
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Fig. 5. Behaviour of the frequency of cooperative actions in a SWN with
p = 0.05 as a function of the number of generations for g = 2 and different
values of N (from top to bottom: 100, 200, 400, 800 and 1600). The remaining
parameters are the same of reference [15]. Each curve averaged over more
than 1000 realizations.
1 10 100 1000
generations
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
co
o
pe
ra
tio
n 
fre
qu
en
cy
N=100
N=200
N=400
N=800
N=1600
N=3200
Fig. 6. Behaviour of the frequency of cooperative actions in a SWN with
p = 0.05 as a function of the number of generations for g = 4 and different
values of N (100, 400 and 1600). The remaining parameters are the same of
reference [15]. Each curve averaged over more than 1000 realizations.
neighbours. In order to be sure that each individual had at
least g − 1 neighbours, we set k = g − 1. Moreover, at the
end of each generation, the offspring was randomly placed
on the preexistent network, which is defined at the beginning
and does not change until the end of the simulation. Anyway,
averaging over different realizations, each one has its own
networks, so that the averages are also over the topology.
In Fig. 5 and 6 we see the cooperation frequencies for
two values of g and different sizes of the system. Basically,
in particular for g > 2, the system shows an interesting
behaviour: in particular, the dynamics is always driving the
system towards the achievement of complete cooperation,
even though the timing can vary: full cooperation is reached
more rapidly for small values of N , whilst it can take up
to thousands of generations for larger systems. It is worth to
notice, from Fig. 6, that this consensus time seems to reach
its limit value already for N = 3200; in such case we can
also distinguish an initial small decrease of cooperation rate
before the final (steep) increase.
In short, these results demonstrate that the small-world
topology in itself makes full cooperation possible, although
not so fastly as in different configurations, as we are going to
show in the next sections.
C. Bipartite graphs
Another topological configuration that accounts better for
the complexity of real interactions among individuals is
the so-called bipartite graph (BG) [17], [18]. A bipartite
representation contains two types of nodes denoting agents
Fig. 7. Structure of a bipartite graph compared with a classical network.
From reference [18].
and groups, respectively. It implies that connections can be
established only between nodes of different types and no
direct connection among individuals is allowed. Thus, such
a bipartite representation preserves the information about the
group structure: if two individuals belong to the same three
groups, they are “more” connected than two other individuals
who are members of the same group. These two pairs would
be equally represented in the classical one-mode projected
network, while with the bipartite graph this mesoscopic level
of interactions is better depicted, as illustrated in Fig. 7.
Also in this case we adapted the original dynamics of the
model to make it work on this kind of network. In particular,
the graph has N individuals distributed into M groups, each
group composed of g members. At the beginning of each
round, the network is built in this way: given F ∈ (0, 1), we
set gF initial members for each groups so that each individual
belongs exclusively to one group. For instance, if N = 150,
g = 20 and F = 0.75 (then M = 10), at this stage we
would have 15 agents in the first group, other 15 in the
second one and so on until the last 15 in the tenth group.
Then, each group must be completed choosing (1− F )g = 5
individuals from the pool of those which do not belong to the
group already. This can be accomplished in two different ways:
first, by randomly picking (1− F )g agents among the rest of
the population; second, by selecting them according to their
reputation, i.e., their image scores. When partner selection is
available, an external player is randomly selected by the group,
but accepted only if its image score is positive. Only if there
is no player in the whole population with good reputation,
a candidate with negative image score is accepted in the
group. Alternative ways of implementing partner selection
were tested, like for example, accepting candidates with image
score equal or larger than the average strategy of the initial
member of the group, but this did not produce any appreciable
effects on the outcome of the simulations. Once the network
is completely defined, each group plays a round of the game,
with the same rules working on CG and SWN. The procedure
(network construction followed by a round of the game of
each group) is repeated 10 times, then the evolution process
takes place again following the same rule given of the previous
cases.
In Fig. 8 and 9 we show the behaviour of the model for
N = 200 (or the closest integer compatible with the remaining
parameters), F = 0.75, with the other parameters equal to the
ones utilized by Suzuki and Akiyama [15].
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Fig. 8. Behaviour of the frequency of cooperative actions in a BG with
as a function of the number of generations for g = 4, and F = 0.75. The
remaining parameters are the same of reference [15]. Each curve averaged
over 1000 realizations.
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Fig. 9. Behaviour of the frequency of cooperative actions in a BG with as
a function of the number of generations for g = 20 and F = 0.75. The
remaining parameters are the same of reference [15]. Each curve averaged
over 1000 realizations.
Our results show that the final cooperation level is lower
here then in the CG case if the added members of the
groups are selected at random. However, when reputation-
based partner selection is available in a population distributed
on a bipartite graph, full cooperation is achieved in a very
short amount of time (about ten generations), and this is true
also for large groups (g = 20 in figure). This result does not
depend on F : even when partner selection is restricted to a
small percentage of agents, it can favour the invasion of the
cooperative strategies throughout the system. This effect can
be explained by the fact that, in general, in PGG it is better
for individuals to get involved in as many groups as possible
in order to maximize their income [21]. However, if this is
not linked to a reputation-based partner selection mechanism,
defection is still very profitable and cooperators are driven out
of the system. On the contrary, if reputation is used to select
group members, having a positive image score has a positive
effect on fitness.
D. Final strategy distributions
In the model by Nowak and Sigmund [5], [19], based on the
same image score mechanism, when the system ends up in a
final configuration of complete cooperation, the only surviving
strategy is usually k = 0, that is, the “winning” strategy is a
rather moderately generous one. A similar behaviour appears
with our model in CG and SW topologies.
On the other hand, when working on BG topology, the
final system configuration, always totally cooperative, presents
all the negative strategies, i.e. the more cooperative ones,
as shown in Fig. 10. This means that taking account more
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Fig. 10. Final (relative) strategy abundance for a system on BG, same system
of Fig. 8 (g = 4) with reputation-based choice of the added members of each
group. Values averaged over 1000 realizations.
carefully of the real properties of the social interactions among
idividuals not only enhances hugely cooperation to spread
throughout the whole population, but allows the survival also
to the most generous and altruistic strategies.
IV. DISCUSSION
In a PGG in which the story of agents’ past interactions is
publicly available as an image score, cooperation can emerge
and be maintained for small groups of agents. When we move
from a mean-field situation to a small-world network, we
observe that cooperation becomes stable after one hundred
generations and for g = 4. The real improvement is achieved
thanks to the introduction of a partner choice mechanism on a
bi-partite graph, where if a small percentage of group members
are chosen on the basis of their reputations, cooperation can
thrive.
In a social dilemma the introduction of a reputation mecha-
nism for partner selection on a bipartite graph makes deception
unprofitable, thus cooperators can thrive. In such an envi-
ronment, agents with a positive reputation are more socially
desirable, thus they can enter several groups in which their
contributions help to achieve the social optimum. On the other
hand, defectors with negative reputations are actively avoided,
thus driving them to complete extinction after ten generations.
Even more striking is the fact that, unlike other models [15],
[22], full cooperation is maintained even when group size
increases.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
The puzzle of the evolution of cooperation in humans can be
successfully addressed if we take into account features of hu-
man societies that could have paved the way for the emergence
of cooperative behaviors, like social networks and reputation.
Moving from a replication of Suzuky and Akiyama [15] we
showed that cooperation can emerge and be maintained in
groups of agents playing a PGG on a network. We used two
network topologies with different group and total population
size, finding interesting differences especially in terms of the
maximum level of cooperation achieved. Our results show that
when partner selection is available in an affiliative network,
cooperation can be easily reached even in large groups and
for large system size.
The importance of social institutions [2] and informal social
control [6], [23] is well known to social scientists who, like
Ellickson [24], have stressed the importance of these features:
“A close-knit group has been defined as a social network
whose members have credible and reciprocal prospects for
the application of power against one another and a good
supply of information on past and present internal events
[. . . ]. The hypothesis predicts that departures from conditions
of reciprocal power, ready sanctioning opportunities, and
adequate information are likely to impair the emergence of
welfare-maximizing norms” (p. 181).
Introducing a small world network does not alter the dy-
namics of cooperation in a PGG in a fundamental way, and
this is also true for a bipartite graph with random partner
selection. However, when we model the world as made of
groups that can actively select at least one of their members,
cooperators outperform free-riders in an easy and fast way.
The evolutionary dynamics of our model can be linked to
have a proximate explanation in psychological mechanisms
for ostracism and social exclusion, two dreadful outcomes for
human beings [25], [26]. In large groups of unrelated indi-
viduals, direct observation is not possible, and usually records
of an individual’s past behaviors are not freely and publicly
available. What is abundant and costless is gossip, i.e., reported
information about others’ past actions, that can be used to
avoid free-riders, either by refusing to interact with them,
or joining another crew in which free-riders are supposedly
absent. For this reason we plan to run simulations in which
agents will be able to report private information about their
past experiences, thus overcoming the unrealistic limitations
posed by image score. We posit that the combination of a bi-
partite graph social structure and gossip like exchanges will
mimic human societies better and will provide useful insights
about the evolution of cooperation in humans.
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